Classement thématique série 1848–1945:
IV. LES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES ET FINANCIÈRES AVEC LES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES
Pubblicato in
Documenti Diplomatici Svizzeri, vol. 7-II, doc. 10
volume linkBern 1984
Dettagli… |▼▶Collocazione
Archivio | Archivio federale svizzero, Berna | |
▼ ▶ Segnatura | CH-BAR#E2200.40-05#1000/1631#3* | |
Vecchia segnatura | CH-BAR E 2200.40-05(-)1000/1631 1 | |
Titolo dossier | Arrangement entre les Gouvernements suisses et français, etc. (1919–1919) | |
Riferimento archivio | I.C.4 • Componente aggiuntiva: Grossbritannien und Nordirland |
dodis.ch/44221
I will now endeavour to deal as fully as possible with the questions contained in your Excellency’s Memorandum to me of the 4th instant, based on telegram No. 18 received by you from Berne.2
1. There appears to be not the slightest intention here of in any way suppressing the accord of Washington of the 22nd January3, which will not be affected by the ratification of peace. The British Government, through the Shipping Control, consider it obligatory on them to fulfil their engagement towards Switzerland and deliver the tonnage accordingly. It is most improbable that any renewal of this Convention will be entertained.
2. To give an exact appreciation of the situation of Switzerland when, the Convention being over and fulfilled, Switzerland has to rely on covering its needs in the open market, is difficult in the extreme. I think you may take it as a fact that all restrictions on neutral tonnage including the necessity of licences, right of requisition etc., may be considered as wiped out.
But on the other hand, it is equally practically certain that British tonnage will not be so freed, but will be for a considerable period, at any rate one if not two years, still maintained under control by the Admiralty and Shipping authorities here, this control being exercised in view of the necessity of directing British tonnage where it is most imperatively required in the interests of British trade and supplies.
This being the case it will be seen that Switzerland may have to rely for its freight requirements on its power of chartering neutral tonnage, the rates on which and the facility of obtaining such tonnage depending of course on the quantity of neutral tonnage available for chartering.
I am greatly in hopes, however, and am taking quiet steps to further these hopes in any way possible, that the position of Switzerland so far as regards the chartering of British tonnage as supplementary to the neutral tonnage she will charter, may be considered by the British Government on much the same footing as say, Belgium. Belgium will obtain certain favoured modifications so far as regards being allowed to charter British tonnage; and I am endeavouring to get the principle adopted here, that Switzerland, in view of the relatively small tonnage she requires, may be equally favourably regarded.
Part of course, of Switzerland’s freight requirements will be supplied by the Union Maritime4 tonnage, which as soon as the present control under the Convention is terminated, will be freed from British procedure.
3. It is difficult to see how the abrogation of licensing and chartering control can render tonnage more abundant. Undoubtedly the price of steamers is rising. £180,000 was the price paid some little while back for a certain class and tonnage of steamer. For this same boat the price of £225,000 is now offered.
Again, an entirely unknown factor is the extent to which Germany may come in as a charterer of tonnage. If she is able to effect imports and consequently must have tonnage to carry those imports, this will naturally be a factor decreasing the available tonnage in the market.
Another point which must be borne in mind is that whereas in pre-war times large populations in Europe were supplied by European grain, the disturbance in agriculture owing to the war, and the practical non-existence of Russia at any rate at present, as a wheat-exporting country, have produced the effect that such large European populations have now to be provisioned by grain from overseas, which accordingly locks up for long periods a very large amount of tonnage which would otherwise have been making short journeys.
At present the actual tonnage floating may be taken to be just about the same as the amount floating in 1914, and this amount will of course increase, though not as rapidly as was first expected; but any such increase will, in the opinion of those best competent to judge here, and with whom I have been in contact in order to obtain the best opinion for the guidance of the Swiss authorities, be more than swallowed up by the excess demands as indicated above; and it is impossible to foresee any substantial decrease in freights for at any rate, 1920.
It is estimated here that the extra call on tonnage to carry grain across the Atlantic for instance, to Europe, will be something like seven millions tons.
4. In regard to the general effect of all the foregoing for the Union Maritime Suisse, it would appear that the value of this concern under the possibility of its increased services to the Swiss trading etc. community, should be enhanced.
5. To resume the foregoing, as to the position of Switzerland on termination of the Convention, while I do not see any actual cause for alarm, yet the position will be undoubtedly difficult. It is probable that sufficient tonnage will be able to be acquired in the open market, which with the vessels possessed by the Union Maritime will suffice for Swiss requirements. But the rates of freight may be onerous, and in any case no reliance should be placed on much reduction in rates of freight.
6. Your Excellency will quite understand how very difficult it is at such a time as the present to give definite opinions or advice. All I have endeavoured to do is to obtain from the most competent and the most authoritative quarters here, their views of the freight situation, and this I think I have as fully and as fairly as possible embodied in the above Note.5
- 1
- Lettre: E 2200 London 31/1.↩
- 2
- Ce télégramme du Département de l’Economie publique, expédié le 3 juillet de Berne (reçu le 4 juillet), était ainsi conçu: Apprenons officiellement qu’après ratification Traité Paix par Allemagne, Alliés seraient disposés supprimer immédiatement accord 22 janvier, y compris accord concernant tonnage. Veuillez examiner avec Palliser et Honegger[Représentant de la FERO à Londres]quelle serait notre situation, au cas où devrions couvrir nos besoins tonnage en marché libre. Peut-on compter qu’Alliés supprimeront réquisition et contrôle bateaux et que tonnage sera en conséquence plus abondant. Portée pour Union Maritime très importante pour nous; veuillez nous donner votre avis aussi sur cette question. (E 2200 London 31/1).↩
- 3
- Cf. DDS 7/1, no 136.↩
- 4
- L’Union Maritime était une société privée, fondée en 1918, à laquelle la Confédération participait pour la moitié du capital-actions; elle succédait à /Office d’importation de la chambre syndicale des fabricants suisses de chocolats. Sur la fondation et les buts de l’Union Maritime, cf. E 1004 1/269, nos 3020, 3576, 3716, 3904, 3905.↩
- 5
- Sur l’ordre du Département de l’Economie publique, la Légation de Suisse à Washington entreprit une enquête analogue. Par télégramme no 5 du 14 juillet, reçu le 16, le Conseiller commercial de la Légation de Suisse à Washington, Oederlin, donnait l’appréciation suivante: [...] Auf alle Fälle sollte von Weiterführung jetzigen Abkommens ohne reduzierte Raten abgesehen werden. Ob Aufhebung trotz reduzierten Raten ratsam, hängt wohl davon ab, wie Sie die Gesamtlage, besonders auch in London, einschätzen. [...] (EVD KW Zentrale 1914–1918/ 1–2). Pour la solution apportée à cette question du tonnage, cf. no 15, annexes.↩
Tags
Negoziati economici e finanziari con gli Alleati (Prima Guerra mondiale)